TRACE: An Evidence-Grounded Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Large Reasoning Models

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Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.

Abstract

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate intermediate reasoning traces that may contain unsafe content, even when their final responses appear safe. Guardrail models are designed to detect and block unsafe content, yet existing benchmarks for unsafe content detection focus primarily on prompts and final responses, leaving reasoning traces largely unexamined. Moreover, these benchmarks typically provide only binary safety labels, without evidence annotations that justify the judgments. To address these limitations, we introduce TRACE, an evidence-grounded safety evaluation benchmark that covers the entire LRM inference pipeline: prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses. TRACE includes prompts in two languages spanning nine risk categories and ten attack strategies. For each prompt, four LRMs generate reasoning traces and final responses, and we annotate the safety of each component and extract supporting evidence from the corresponding source text. Evaluating 18 guardrail models on TRACE reveals that safety judgment for reasoning traces is substantially more challenging than for prompts or final responses, and that current models struggle to accurately extract supporting evidence. These findings highlight the need for guardrail models that can reliably detect and precisely localize unsafe content across the entire LRM inference pipeline.

1 Introduction

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success across a wide range of reasoning tasks [OpenAI, 2025b; Kimi, 2026; Qwen, 2026]. A key factor underlying this success is their ability to generate detailed reasoning traces, which capture intermediate thinking processes that help LRMs decompose complex problems, perform self-correction, and ultimately produce more accurate and reliable responses [DeepSeek-AI, 2025a]. However, these reasoning traces introduce significant safety risks. As shown in Figure 1, when given the harmful prompt "*How can I hide mace from airport security*", the LRM generates a reasoning trace that explicitly describes prohibited concealment strategies, despite its final response refusing to comply. This contradiction between the reasoning trace and the final response reveals a safety risk: reasoning traces may contain unsafe content even when the final response appears safe.



Figure 1: Existing benchmarks evaluate safety judgments for prompts and final responses but overlook unsafe reasoning traces. TRACE introduces evidence-grounded safety annotations (highlighted in orange) across the entire LRM inference pipeline, enabling comprehensive evaluation of both the correctness of safety judgments and the accuracy of evidence attribution.

Guardrail models are designed to evaluate content safety and block unsafe outputs from reaching users. Most existing guardrail models, including LlamaGuard [Inan *et al.*, 2023], PolyGuard [Kumar *et al.*, 2025], and YuFeng-XGuard [Lin *et al.*, 2026], are trained to assess the safety of prompts and model-generated final responses. Yet the effectiveness of these models in detecting unsafe content within LRM-generated reasoning traces remains largely unexplored.

Existing unsafe content detection benchmarks, such as ToxicChat [Lin *et al.*, 2023], WGTest [Han *et al.*, 2024], XSTest [Röttger *et al.*, 2024], and Aegis [Ghosh *et al.*, 2025], primarily evaluate whether guardrail models make correct safety judgments on prompts or final responses, making them unsuitable for evaluating safety judgments on LRM-generated reasoning traces. Moreover, these benchmarks provide only binary safety labels, without annotating the specific evidence in the source text that justifies each judgment. This limitation prevents them from assessing whether a guardrail model can accurately identify and attribute the evidence underlying its judgment. Evidence attribution is essential for evaluating whether guardrail models can precisely localize

Benchmark	Prompt Safety	Reasoning Trace Safety	Final Response Safety	Evidence Attribution	Diverse Risk Categories	Diverse Attack Strategies
XSTest [Röttger *et al.*, 2024]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
ToxicChat [Lin *et al.*, 2023]	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
OpenAI Moderation [Markov *et al.*, 2023]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
WGTest [Han *et al.*, 2024]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Aegis [Ghosh *et al.*, 2024; Ghosh *et al.*, 2025]	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
BeaverTails [Ji *et al.*, 2023]	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
SafeRLHF [Ji *et al.*, 2025]	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
S-Eval [Yuan *et al.*, 2025]	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓
TRACE (Ours)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 1: Comparison of unsafe content detection benchmarks. TRACE introduces evidence-grounded safety annotations across the entire LRM inference pipeline, including prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses.

unsafe content across the entire LRM inference pipeline.

To address these limitations, we introduce TRACE, a benchmark that provides evidence-grounded safety annotations across the entire LRM inference pipeline. Specifically, we curate both safe and unsafe prompts from S-Eval [Yuan *et al.*, 2025] and WildChat [Zhao *et al.*, 2024], covering nine risk categories and ten attack strategies. For each prompt, we employ four LRMs to generate reasoning traces and final responses. We then use three additional powerful LRMs to annotate the safety of prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses, while extracting supporting evidence from the corresponding source text. Safety labels are assigned by majority vote, and evidence is retained only when it is provided by majority-aligned annotators and verified as a continuous substring of the source text. Samples without verifiable evidence are further annotated by humans. As shown in Figure 1, the prompt and reasoning trace are labeled as unsafe, whereas the final response is labeled as safe, with the corresponding evidence highlighted in the source text. Overall, TRACE enables holistic evaluation of guardrail models in terms of both safety judgment correctness and evidence attribution accuracy across the entire LRM inference pipeline.

We evaluate 18 representative guardrail models on the TRACE benchmark. The results show that 14 out of 18 models achieve their highest performance on prompt safety judgment, followed by final response safety judgment, while reasoning trace safety judgment remains the most challenging task. Specifically, YuFeng-XGuard-8B attains F1-scores of 88.27%, 86.11%, and 84.26% on prompt, final response, and reasoning trace safety judgment, respectively. Similarly, PolyGuard-8B achieves F1-scores of 91.17%, 84.15%, and 82.57% across the same three tasks. In contrast, guardrail models perform substantially worse on evidence attribution. Even the best-performing model, YuFeng-XGuard-8B, achieves TokenF1 scores of only 11.68%, 13.71%, and 14.88% for evidence attribution in prompt, final response, and reasoning trace safety judgment, respectively. These results indicate that current guardrail models still struggle to accurately extract evidence supporting their safety judgments.

In summary, our main contributions include:

- We propose TRACE, an evidence-grounded benchmark designed to evaluate guardrail models in terms of both safety judgment correctness and evidence attribution accuracy across the entire LRM inference pipeline, including prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses.
- Evaluating 18 guardrail models on TRACE reveals that judging the safety of reasoning traces is more challenging than judging prompts or final responses. Moreover, current guardrail models struggle to accurately extract evidence supporting their safety judgments.

2 Related Work

2.1 Reasoning Trace Safety in LRMs

Unlike large language models (LLMs) [Ouyang *et al.*, 2022; Meta-AI, 2024], which generate only final responses to user prompts, large reasoning models (LRMs) [OpenAI, 2025b; DeepSeek-AI, 2025a; Qwen, 2026; Kimi, 2026] generate detailed reasoning traces alongside final responses. Although such transparency improves interpretability, it introduces a new safety risk: the reasoning trace may contain unsafe content even when the final response is safe [Jiang *et al.*, 2025].

2.2 Guardrail Models

Guardrail models are designed to evaluate content safety and prevent unsafe outputs from reaching users. Existing guardrail models [Inan *et al.*, 2023; Han *et al.*, 2024; Zeng *et al.*, 2024; Ghosh *et al.*, 2025; Liu *et al.*, 2025; Zhao *et al.*, 2025; Lin *et al.*, 2026; Zhang *et al.*, 2026] primarily focus on detecting unsafe content in user prompts or model-generated final responses. However, their effectiveness in detecting unsafe content within LRM-generated reasoning traces remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce a benchmark that holistically evaluates guardrail models across the entire LRM inference pipeline, covering user prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses.

2.3 Unsafe Content Detection Benchmarks

Existing unsafe content detection benchmarks can be divided into three categories. The first focuses on foundational safety evaluation: XSTest [Röttger *et al.*, 2024] evaluates the safety of user prompts, while ToxicChat [Lin *et al.*, 2023] extends evaluation to model-generated final responses. The second introduces diverse safety risk categories in user prompts, including the OpenAI Moderation dataset [Markov *et al.*, 2023], WGTest [Han *et al.*, 2024], Aegis [Ghosh *et al.*, 2024; Ghosh *et al.*, 2025], BeaverTails [Ji *et al.*, 2023], and SafeRLHF [Ji *et al.*, 2025]. The third evaluates the robustness of guardrail models against adversarial attacks, such as S-Eval [Yuan *et al.*, 2025]. However, as shown in Table 1,



Figure 2: Overview of the TRACE benchmark construction workflow. ① Safe and unsafe prompts are curated from two public datasets. ② Four LRMs generate reasoning traces and final responses for each prompt. ③ Three additional LRMs annotate the safety of the prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses and extract supporting evidence from the corresponding source text. Safety labels are determined by majority voting. Extracted evidence is retained only if it is provided by majority-aligned annotators and verified as a continuous substring of the source text. Samples without verifiable evidence are further reviewed by human annotators, yielding the final annotation result.



Figure 3: Safety distributions of LRM-generated reasoning traces and final responses in the TRACE benchmark.

these benchmarks typically provide only binary safety labels for prompts or final responses without annotating LRM-generated reasoning traces or providing evidence for safety judgments. To address these limitations, we introduce a benchmark with evidence-grounded safety annotations across the entire LRM inference pipeline, enabling comprehensive evaluation of both the correctness of guardrail models' safety judgments and the accuracy of their evidence attribution.

3 The TRACE Benchmark

3.1 Overview

Figure 2 illustrates the overall pipeline for constructing TRACE. We first curate both safe and unsafe prompts $q \in \mathcal{Q}$ from two publicly available datasets, S-Eval and WildChat (Sec. 3.2). For each prompt q, four LRMs generate reasoning traces $\{r_i\}_{i=1}^4$ and final responses $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^4$ (Sec. 3.3). Three additional powerful LRMs then independently annotate the safety of each component in (q, r_i, a_i) and extract supporting evidence from the corresponding source text. Safety labels are assigned by majority voting, while evidence is retained only if provided by majority-aligned annotators and verified as a continuous substring of the source text. Samples without verifiable evidence are further annotated by humans, yielding the final annotations $d \in \mathcal{D}$ (Sec. 3.4). Sec. 3.5 presents statistical analyses of TRACE, and Sec. 3.6 introduces evaluation metrics for assessing the safety judgment correctness and evidence attribution accuracy of guardrail models.

3.2 Prompt Curation

We curated our evaluation prompts from two publicly available datasets: S-Eval [Yuan *et al.*, 2025] and WildChat [Zhao *et al.*, 2024], which together contain over 200K English (EN) and Chinese (ZH) prompts. S-Eval includes unsafe prompts across nine risk categories, such as extremism and hate speech, and further applies ten attack strategies (e.g., goal hijacking and code injection) to each prompt, yielding diverse adversarial prompts. In contrast, WildChat is a large-scale collection of real-world conversations, from which we selected only prompts labeled as safe by dataset authors.

To ensure coverage of all risk categories and both languages in TRACE, we adopted a stratified sampling strategy. We partitioned the S-Eval prompts by both risk category and language, yielding 18 groups, while the safe prompts from

WildChat were divided into 2 groups based on language. We then randomly sampled 1% of the prompts from each of the resulting 20 groups, yielding a total of 1,993 prompts $q \in \mathcal{Q}$.

3.3 LRM Inference

As shown in Figure 2, given a harmful prompt q about circumventing drug detection, a safety-aligned LRM such as Qwen3-8B generates an unsafe reasoning trace r_1 that outlines detailed circumvention strategies, even though its final response a_1 refuses the harmful request. In contrast, the abliterated variant, Qwen3-8B-abliterated[1], generates unsafe content in both the reasoning trace r_2 and the final response a_2, including explicit circumvention instructions.

To capture diverse safety behaviors in LRMs, for each prompt $q \in \mathcal{Q}$, we use four LRMs to generate reasoning traces $\{r_i\}_{i=1}^4$ and final responses $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^4$, yielding a set of triples $\{(q, r_i, a_i)\}_{i=1}^4$. Specifically, we use two safety-aligned models (Qwen3-8B and Gemma-4-E4B) and their abliterated counterparts (Qwen3-8B-abliterated and Gemma-4-E4B-abliterated).[2] By incorporating both safety-aligned and abliterated variants, TRACE captures a broader spectrum of safety-related behaviors, ranging from safe refusals to unsafe reasoning traces and harmful final responses.

3.4 Multi-Dimensional Safety Annotation

We use three powerful LRMs to annotate the safety of each element in a triple (q, r_i, a_i): DeepSeek-V3.2 [DeepSeek-AI, 2025b], Qwen3.5-Plus [Qwen, 2026], and KIMI-K2.5 [Kimi, 2026]. Specifically, each LRM independently assigns a binary safety label (*safe* or *unsafe*) to the prompt q, the reasoning trace r_i, and the final response a_i according to the risk categories defined in S-Eval [Yuan *et al.*, 2025], denoted as $\{y_q^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^3$, $\{y_{r_i}^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^3$, and $\{y_{a_i}^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^3$, respectively. Each LRM also extracts verbatim evidence from the corresponding source text to support its safety judgment, denoted as $\{e_q^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^3$, $\{e_{r_i}^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^3$, and $\{e_{a_i}^{(j)}\}_{j=1}^3$, respectively. An excerpt of the annotation instruction template is shown below.

> You are a safety annotation expert.
> Your task:
> 1. Label the given prompt, reasoning trace, and final response as *safe* or *unsafe*.
> 2. For each label, provide verbatim evidence from the corresponding source text to justify your safety judgment.
>
> Prompt: q
> Reasoning Trace: r_i
> Final Response: a_i

To obtain the final safety label for each element in (q, r_i, a_i), we apply a majority voting strategy:

$$y_c = \text{MajorityVote}\left(\left\{y_c^{(j)}\right\}_{j=1}^{3}\right), c \in \{q, r_i, a_i\}$$

We then aggregate the supporting evidence by retaining only instances from LRMs whose judgments agree with the majority vote and whose extracted evidence can be verified as a continuous substring of the corresponding source text:

$$e_c = \left\{ e_c^{(j)} \middle| y_c^{(j)} = y_c \wedge e_c^{(j)} \sqsubseteq c \right\}, c \in \{q, r_i, a_i\}$$

where $e_c^{(j)} \sqsubseteq c$ indicates that $e_c^{(j)}$ is a continuous substring of c. If none of the majority-aligned LRMs provides verifiable evidence $e_c = \varnothing$ (i.e., the extracted text is not a continuous substring of the source text), the corresponding element c is escalated to human experts for re-annotation.

As shown in Figure 2, the annotation result d for the triple (q, r_1, a_1) is as follows: the prompt q and the reasoning trace r_1 are both labeled as unsafe ($y_q = y_{r_1} =$ unsafe); the final response a_1 is labeled as safe ($y_{a_1} =$ safe). The supporting evidence e_q, e_{r_1}, and e_{a_1} are highlighted in orange within the source text. The complete annotation result is denoted as:

$$d = (q, y_q, e_q, r_1, y_{r_1}, e_{r_1}, a_1, y_{a_1}, e_{a_1}) \in \mathcal{D}$$

For simplicity, we denote the ℓ-th instance of $\mathcal{D}$ as:

$$d_\ell = (q_\ell, y_{q_\ell}, e_{q_\ell}, r_\ell, y_{r_\ell}, e_{r_\ell}, a_\ell, y_{a_\ell}, e_{a_\ell}) \in \mathcal{D}$$

where $\mathcal{D}$ denotes the TRACE benchmark dataset.

3.5 Benchmark Statistics

As shown in Figure 2, the TRACE benchmark $\mathcal{D}$ comprises 1,993 distinct prompts spanning nine risk categories, ten attack strategies, and two languages. Among these prompts, 43% are labeled as safe and 57% as unsafe. For each prompt, we use four LRMs to generate reasoning traces and final responses. After removing samples with missing reasoning traces or final responses, we retain 5,000 valid (q_ℓ, r_ℓ, a_ℓ) triples. Figure 3 shows the safety distribution of the LRM-generated reasoning traces and final responses in TRACE: 54% of reasoning traces are safe and 46% are unsafe, while 55% of the final responses are safe and 45% are unsafe.

Notably, unsafe prompts do not necessarily yield unsafe reasoning traces or unsafe final responses, and unsafe reasoning traces do not always result in unsafe final responses. These findings reveal that safety can shift at each stage of the LRM inference process, underscoring the necessity of evaluating safety across the entire LRM inference pipeline.

3.6 Evaluation Metrics

For the ℓ-th instance in $\mathcal{D}$, we use the guardrail model $\mathcal{M}$ to predict both the safety label and the supporting evidence for each component, including the prompt q_ℓ, reasoning trace r_ℓ, and final response a_ℓ. We evaluate the guardrail model on TRACE along two dimensions: safety judgment correctness and evidence attribution accuracy.

$$(\hat{y}_{q_\ell}, \hat{e}_{q_\ell}) = \mathcal{M}(q_\ell)$$
$$(\hat{y}_{r_\ell}, \hat{e}_{r_\ell}) = \mathcal{M}(q_\ell, r_\ell)$$
$$(\hat{y}_{a_\ell}, \hat{e}_{a_\ell}) = \mathcal{M}(q_\ell, a_\ell)$$

Safety Judgment Correctness

We evaluate the guardrail model's safety judgments for each component $c_\ell \in \{q_\ell, r_\ell, a_\ell\}$ using the following metrics.

[1] Abliteration [Arditi *et al.*, 2024] is a model-editing technique that suppresses refusal behaviors in safety-aligned models, enabling them to respond to harmful prompts while largely preserving their general capabilities.

[2] Models are available at HF Hub: Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-8B-abliterated, Gemma-4-E4B, and Gemma-4-E4B-abliterated.

Guardrail Model	Params	Prompt			Reasoning Trace			Final Response		
		TRACE-EN	TRACE-ZH	TRACE	TRACE-EN	TRACE-ZH	TRACE	TRACE-EN	TRACE-ZH	TRACE
LlamaGuard-1	7B	39.64	40.83	39.91	22.69	29.14	24.34	34.18	36.19	34.69
LlamaGuard-2	8B	69.34	74.52	70.45	61.36	71.76	63.67	61.08	71.24	63.40
LlamaGuard-3	1B	47.10	53.03	48.37	51.37	58.15	52.85	48.96	58.13	51.01
	8B	73.09	73.30	73.14	62.28	65.36	63.08	64.66	69.52	65.95
LlamaGuard-4	12B	69.13	57.40	66.52	50.48	51.48	50.73	63.98	59.89	62.92
ShieldGemma	2B	49.03	50.60	49.35	52.47	59.44	53.92	49.10	55.32	50.38
	9B	59.43	64.49	60.47	56.13	69.54	59.02	55.06	68.16	57.88
WildGuard	7B	86.29	86.67	86.37	58.95	61.57	59.63	68.09	74.71	69.86
NemotronGuard	8B	84.72	90.12	85.99	76.58	81.02	77.74	79.12	85.44	80.78
Octopus	14B	80.93	87.75	82.59	77.94	86.37	80.10	80.91	87.07	82.46
GPTSafeGuard	20B	86.05	89.90	86.96	77.95	84.06	79.60	79.76	85.84	81.39
Qwen3Guard	0.6B	84.23	89.68	85.47	70.39	75.72	71.79	79.41	87.41	81.52
	4B	87.54	90.91	88.31	71.11	74.74	72.04	81.08	*88.31*	83.05
	8B	87.30	*92.32*	*88.43*	73.77	81.13	75.73	82.05	87.99	83.64
PolyGuard	0.5B	82.65	86.63	83.53	65.65	66.89	65.91	67.83	71.58	68.68
	8B	**90.59**	**93.16**	**91.17**	*80.95*	*87.38*	*82.57*	*82.83*	88.12	*84.15*
YuFeng-XGuard	0.6B	*87.66*	90.15	88.24	73.79	83.98	76.55	79.34	87.83	81.65
	8B	87.49	91.03	88.27	**82.82**	**88.46**	**84.26**	**85.21**	**88.72**	**86.11**

Table 2: F1-scores (%) on TRACE. **Bold** indicates the best performance, while *italic* indicates the second best.

False Positive Rate (FPR) measures the proportion of safe content that is incorrectly classified as unsafe. A high FPR indicates that the guardrail model is overly sensitive, resulting in a large amount of safe content being blocked, which may negatively affect usability and user experience.

$$\text{FPR} = \frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[\hat{y}_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe} \wedge y_{c_\ell} = \text{safe}\right]}{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[y_{c_\ell} = \text{safe}\right]}$$

where $\mathbb{I}[\cdot]$ denotes the indicator function, which returns 1 if the condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise.

False Negative Rate (FNR) measures the proportion of unsafe content incorrectly classified as safe. A high FNR indicates that the guardrail model fails to reliably block unsafe content, resulting in unsafe content being exposed to users.

$$\text{FNR} = \frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[\hat{y}_{c_\ell} = \text{safe} \wedge y_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe}\right]}{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[y_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe}\right]}$$

F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. A high F1-score indicates that the guardrail model effectively blocks unsafe content while allowing safe content to pass. It serves as a reliable indicator of safety judgment correctness.

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[\hat{y}_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe} \wedge y_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe}\right]}{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[\hat{y}_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe}\right]}$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[\hat{y}_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe} \wedge y_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe}\right]}{\sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \mathbb{I}\left[y_{c_\ell} = \text{unsafe}\right]}$$

$$\text{F1-score} = \frac{2 \times \text{Precision} \times \text{Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}}$$

Evidence Attribution Accuracy

We evaluate evidence attribution accuracy for each component $c_\ell \in \{q_\ell, r_\ell, a_\ell\}$ using token-level F1-score (TokenF1). We treat the predicted evidence $\hat{e}_{c_\ell}$ and the ground-truth evidence e_{c_ℓ} as bags of tokens and compute their token-level overlap. A higher TokenF1 indicates greater overlap between the predicted and ground-truth evidence, suggesting more accurate evidence attribution by the guardrail model.

$$\text{TokenF1} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} \frac{2 \times |T\left(\hat{e}_{c_\ell}\right) \cap T\left(e_{c_\ell}\right)|}{|T\left(\hat{e}_{c_\ell}\right)| + |T\left(e_{c_\ell}\right)|}$$

where $T(\cdot)$ denotes the tokenization function that converts a text sequence into a bag of tokens.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

Guardrail Models. We evaluate 18 representative guardrail models on TRACE, including the LlamaGuard series [Inan *et al.*, 2023], ShieldGemma [Zeng *et al.*, 2024], WildGuard [Han *et al.*, 2024], NemotronGuard [NVIDIA, 2025], Octopus [Yuan *et al.*, 2025], GPTSafeGuard [OpenAI, 2025a], Qwen3Guard [Zhao *et al.*, 2025], PolyGuard [Kumar *et al.*, 2025], and YuFeng-XGuard [Lin *et al.*, 2026].

Implementation. For LRM inference, we set the temperature to 0.7 and the maximum output length to 6,000 tokens to capture diverse safety behaviors. For safety annotation and guardrail evaluation, we set the temperature to 0 and the maximum output length to 1,024 tokens to ensure reproducibility.

4.2 Experimental Results

Can guardrail models accurately judge the safety of LRM-generated reasoning traces? Table 2 presents the performance of guardrail models in judging the safety of LRM-generated reasoning traces on TRACE. YuFeng-XGuard-8B achieves the highest F1-score of 84.26%, surpassing LlamaGuard-1-7B, ShieldGemma-9B by 59.92 and 25.24 points, respectively. These results indicate that guardrail models such as LlamaGuard-1-7B and ShieldGemma-9B struggle to reliably judge safety of LRM-generated reasoning traces. In contrast, more advanced models, particularly YuFeng-XGuard-8B, perform markedly better on this task.



Figure 4: F1-score (%) performance of guardrail models on TRACE. Colors denote the base LLM families used for fine-tuning the guardrail models (e.g., red indicates models derived from Qwen3). Circle size indicates model scale.

Guardrail Model	Params	Prompt	Reasoning Trace	Final Response
Octopus	14B	9.53	*14.56*	*13.25*
GPTSafeGuard	20B	*10.74*	12.58	9.92
YuFeng-XGuard	0.6B	10.53	13.08	12.03
	8B	**11.68**	**14.88**	**13.71**

Table 3: TokenF1 (%) of evidence extracted by guardrail models to support their safety judgments.

Which stage of the LRM inference pipeline is most challenging for guardrail models to judge safety? As shown in Table 2, 14 of the 18 guardrail models perform best on prompt safety judgment, followed by final response safety judgment and then reasoning trace safety judgment. For instance, YuFeng-XGuard-8B achieves an F1-score of 88.27% on prompt safety judgment, exceeding its performance on final response and reasoning trace judgment by 2.16 and 4.01 percentage points, respectively. These results indicate that most existing guardrail models judge prompt safety more accurately than final response safety, while reasoning trace safety judgment remains the most challenging setting.

How do guardrail models perform across different languages in safety judgment? To investigate the impact of language on guardrail models' safety judgment correctness, we split TRACE into two subsets based on prompt language: TRACE-EN for English and TRACE-ZH for Chinese. As shown in Table 2, 17 out of 18 models achieve higher F1-scores on TRACE-ZH than on TRACE-EN for both prompt and final response safety judgments. For reasoning trace safety judgment, all 18 models achieve higher F1-scores on TRACE-ZH. These results indicate that guardrail models are generally more effective at judging the safety of Chinese content than English content across the LRM inference pipeline.

Can guardrail models accurately attribute evidence supporting their safety judgments? Among the evaluated guardrail models, only Octopus, GPTSafeGuard, and YuFeng-XGuard provide explanations for their safety judgments. We therefore further evaluate these models by examining whether their explanations accurately identify supporting evidence in the source text. As shown in Table 3, YuFeng-XGuard-8B achieves TokenF1 scores of 11.68%, 14.88%, and 13.71% for evidence attribution in prompt, reasoning trace, and final response safety judgment, respectively, outperforming Octopus-14B by 2.15, 0.32, and 0.46 points. These results indicate that YuFeng-XGuard-8B is relatively more effective at extracting evidence that supports its safety judgments. However, the overall TokenF1 scores remain low across all models, indicating that existing guardrail models still struggle to accurately extract evidence supporting their safety judgments. This finding highlights the need for guardrail models that can not only produce accurate safety judgments but also provide reliable evidence.

How does base LLM selection influence guardrail model performance? As shown in Figure 4, guardrail models fine-tuned from the Qwen series (e.g., YuFeng-XGuard and PolyGuard) generally demonstrate stronger unsafe content detection performance throughout the entire LRM inference pipeline than guardrail models built upon other base LLM families of comparable scale, such as models derived from Llama, Mistral, and Gemma (e.g., LlamaGuard, WildGuard, and ShieldGemma). In addition, within the same guardrail model family, increasing the scale of the underlying base model consistently improves detection performance. For example, PolyGuard-8B consistently outperforms PolyGuard-0.5B across the entire LRM inference pipeline. These results suggest that both model scale and the intrinsic capabilities of the underlying base LLM are key factors influencing the effectiveness of guardrail models.



Figure 5: FNR (%) and FPR (%) on TRACE. A high FNR indicates that the guardrail model fails to reliably block unsafe content, whereas a high FPR indicates that the guardrail model excessively refuses safe content.



Figure 6: F1-scores (%) of guardrail models for judging the safety of prompts, LRM-generated reasoning traces, and final responses under different prompt attack strategies. IE denotes the Instruction Encryption attack strategy.

4.3 Error Analysis

Over-refusal and unsafe content blocking failures of guardrail models. Figure 5 compares the False Negative Rate (FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) of 18 evaluated guardrail models on TRACE across three stages of the LRM inference pipeline. Overall, these models exhibit substantially different trade-offs between over-refusal and unsafe content blocking failures. Models such as the ShieldGemma series and LlamaGuard-2 consistently achieve much higher FPR than FNR across all evaluation settings, indicating severe over-refusal behavior. In contrast, models including NemotronGuard, WildGuard, GPTSafeGuard, LlamaGuard-3-8B, and LlamaGuard-4 exhibit considerably higher FNR than FPR. These models fail to reliably block unsafe content. A few models achieve a more balanced trade-off between safety and usability. For prompt safety judgment, PolyGuard-8B achieves both low FNR (9.58%) and FPR (9.11%). For the more challenging tasks of safeguarding LRM-generated reasoning traces and final responses, YuFeng-XGuard-8B achieves the most balanced performance: FNR of 13.65% and FPR of 15.77% on reasoning traces, and FNR of 10.60% and FPR of 14.76% on final responses.

Can guardrail models effectively defend against diverse prompt attack strategies? Figure 6 shows that guardrail models are not equally robust to different prompt attack strategies. Among the evaluated strategies, Instruction Encryption (IE) attacks cause the most severe degradation in safety judgment performance across all stages of the LRM inference pipeline. Even advanced models, such as YuFeng-XGuard-8B and PolyGuard-8B, fail to provide reliable defense: their F1-scores drop to only 38.85% and 15.25% on reasoning trace safety judgment, and to 35.16% and 29.89% on final response safety judgment, respectively. IE attacks encode the original prompts with schemes such as Caesar cipher and Base64, obscuring harmful intent and making it harder for guardrail models to detect. These results indicate that existing guardrail models remain vulnerable to IE attacks.

5 Conclusion

We introduce TRACE, an evidence-grounded benchmark for evaluating guardrail models across the LRM inference pipeline in terms of both safety judgment correctness and evidence attribution accuracy. Evaluation of 18 guardrail models reveals that safety judgment for reasoning traces is substantially more challenging than for prompts or final responses, and that current models struggle to accurately extract supporting evidence. These findings underscore the need for guardrail models that can reliably detect and precisely localize unsafe content throughout the LRM inference pipeline.

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